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Newton’s Principia is justly hailed as a landmark in the history of science. It introduced
new standards of rigor in physics, as well as new mathematical techniques—the “Mathe-
matical Principles of Natural Philosophy” announced in the book’s full title. But what were
these new techniques? Did Newton use the calculus to find out “most of the Propositions”
in his Principia, as he once claimed? Or was his natural philosophy calculated as it was
presented, in the established Archimedean tradition of geometrical physics? Again, was it
as simple as Newton claimed for anyone competent in analysis to “reduce the Demonstra-
tions of the Propositions from their composition back into Analysis”? Or were Newton’s
synthetic methods genuinely novel, and superior to algebraic ones, as the Newtonians also
claimed?
It is this set of issues that Guicciardini seeks to address. What makes his book unique
is that he tries to establish the novelty and content of Newton’s methods so far as pos-
sible by examining the reactions of Newton’s contemporaries, his rivals and acolytes
alike. Guicciardini’s point of departure for this study, as he explains, was in a compari-
son of Newton’s Principia with the masterly commentaries of D. T. Whiteside. Whilst the
54
0315-0860/01 $35.00
Copyright C° 2001 by Academic Press
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.
HMAT 28 REVIEW 55
latter’s insightful translations of Newton’s proofs and reasoning into modern mathematical
language are extraordinarily beneficial for a modern reader, they have the paradoxical side-
effect of obscuring exactly what Newton’s mathematical principles were: the very act of
presenting them homogeneously through modern analysis suppresses their original diver-
sity. Guicciardini’s aim is to recover the originality of Newton’s methods by approaching
the problem historically, to “re-establish the hidden structure” (p. 2) of the Principia by an
examination of its reception by Newton’s contemporaries, as well as Newton’s own reading
of his text as he considered what to include, exclude, or amplify in making the second and
third editions.
The volume is divided into three parts. The first introduces the reader to Newton’s
Principia by giving an overview of Newton’s method of series and fluxions and the math-
ematical methods employed in the Principia. This is not given in opposition to the fine
historical studies of Cohen, Densmore, De Gandt, and Brackenridge, but rather draws on
these (and the work of other scholars such as Nauenberg, Knobloch, Pasini, and Erlichson) to
present as succinctly as possible the methods that are referred to in the succeeding parts of the
book. Part 2 deals with the reactions of the three “biggies”: Newton himself (in considering
radical restructurings of the work); Christiaan Huygens, the doyen of 17th century math-
ematics; and Newton’s main rival, Gottfried Leibniz. In Part 3 Guicciardini examines the
way the Principia was regarded by members of the two rival schools, the Newtonians, on
the one hand, and the Leibnizian mathematicians based mainly in Basel and Paris.
Guicciardini’s main conclusions are as follows. With a few exceptions, Newton did
not work out the propositions of the Principia using his method of infinite series and
fluxions. Some of these exceptions are interesting, as Guicciardini explains: Newton did
work out a solution to the notorious inverse problem analytically; and, if one combines
Newton’s binomial expansion in the Scholium to Proposition 93 in Book 1 with the Taylor
series expansion he gives in Proposition 10, Book 2, and takes into account his analytic
expression of Taylor series from the 1690s, one arrives at the statement that the force is
proportional to the second fluxion of displacement. Indeed, in the 1690s Newton drew this
conclusion, and attempted to give a fluxional representation of central force—thus refuting
the judgements of Costabel and Truesdell that Newton was unable to formulate differential
equations of motion. But this was not his preferred style of mathematics. Newton saw
his synthetic geometric methods as continuous with ancient geometry, as the so-called
“classical scholia” bear witness. Classically, algebra, although useful for invention, could
not be used in demonstration, which must exhibit the construction which solves the problem.
Also, Newton saw geometry as grounded in mechanics; as such it fitted seamlessly with his
natural philosophy. Indeed, he often based his demonstrations on physical insights which
analysis would only obscure, as in his physical modelling of attraction inside spherical
shells and spheres (Propositions 70 and 73, Book 1). Likewise, Newton occasionally made
use of analytic quadratures in the Principia (Propositions 79–83 and 90 and Propositions 91,
Corollary 1), sometimes (Proposition 41, Corollary and Proposition 91, Corollary 2) simply
quoting results he had himself obtained analytically years before. But analytic techniques
did not constitute a unifying method for Newton’s natural philosophy, so he did not allocate
them a prominent role.
Yet, second, neither are Newton’s demonstrations in keeping with the strictures of clas-
sical geometry. The majority depend on his innovative method of first and ultimate ratios,
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the geometrical limit procedures that constitute Newton’s “synthetic method of fluxions.”
Although it is always possible to translate them into their analytic or Leibnizian counter-
parts, there is generally nothing straightforward about this. Many of Newton’s most elegant
demonstrations, taking only a few lines, become very complicated when re-expressed in
terms of algebraic equations. (The converse is also true: certain results that can be proved
very easily with Leibnizian techniques become impracticable when translated into geo-
metric terms.) Thus in his evaluations of central force, Newton finds that its geometrical
measure is proportional to QR=(SP ¢QT)2, where these quantities are all to be understood in
the limit where “P and Q come together”: they are displacements produced “at the very be-
ginning of the motion.” But in evaluating this ratio for various different trajectories, Newton
deploys known geometrical properties of the curve in question to find an equivalent ratio
that will remain finite in the limit where P and Q coincide. For example, to calculate “the
law of centripetal force tending toward the centre of the ellipse” in Proposition 10, Newton
utilizes a recondite relation drawn from Apollonius’ Conics to establish the equality of the
above measure with PC=(2 ¢CB2 ¢CA2), where PC is the distance from the center, and CB
and CA are the semi-axes of the ellipse, all of which are finite in the given limit. While
Newton’s geometry is straightforward (albeit very terse), when he employs his methods of
varying several magnitudes at once, and evaluating magnitudes and their ratios in the limit
(at the very beginning of the motion), he is breaking new mathematical ground behind the
classical fac¸ade.
As Guicciardini shows, it is this very innovativeness of Newton’s methods, coupled with
his refusal to give demonstrations using analysis, that accounts for much of the difficulty his
contemporaries had with the Principia. Thus Huygens, who understood and practiced the
Cartesian analytical style, and countenanced arguments based on geometric infinitesimals,
still had difficulties with Newton’s demonstrations. For although both authors published
their results more geometrico, Huygens insisted on an adherence to classical proportion
theory: one could study variation in magnitudes by comparing changes generated in equal
infinitesimal intervals of time, but one could not consider several physical magnitudes
varying at once and evaluate their limiting ratios, or evaluate force at a point, without leaving
the confines of proportion theory. Even David Gregory, who laid claim in his uncle’s name to
many of the jewels of Newton’s analytic techniques, raised substantially the same criticism.
Why, then, did Newton not simply state that his Principia was wrought using his synthetic
method? Why pretend that it was translated from algebra? Perhaps he might have, were it
not for the wholesale change in climate caused by the accusation of Fatio in 1699, afterwards
repeated by Keill, that Leibniz had plagiarized the calculus from Newton. As Guicciardini
explains, this put Newton in a double bind: on the one hand, he wanted to reinforce this charge
by claiming that the analytic method of fluxions was implicit in the Principia throughout.
But on the other hand, he wanted to emphasize the superiority of his synthetic method
of fluxions, which gave a proper foundation for all apparent uses of infinitesimals in the
Principia, unlike Leibniz’s algorithms, which depended on the existence of infinitesimal
quantities. Confusing the issue, Newton let himself claim that every synthetic demonstration
he had given which involved infinitesimals was essentially an analytic proof in geometric
guise.
That this is far from the case is evidenced by the sheer complexity of the process of
mathematization of dynamics in the five decades following the initial publication of the
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Principia. One of the great strengths of Guicciardini’s book is his detailed account of
this process. Contrary to established myths, he shows that until the 1740s the Newtonians
participated just as actively as their continental rivals in the exploration and amplification of
Newton’s results using analysis, and were just as adept at solving some of these problems. A
case in point is the analytical solution of the inverse problem of inverse cube central forces
by Newton himself in an unpublished paper, and by Cotes and Keill in response to Johann
Bernoulli’s famous criticism of Newton’s treatment of the inverse problem of central forces.
What distinguished the Newtonians from Varignon, Hermann, and the Bernoullis was their
indifference to the importance of the latters’ procedure of setting up general differential
equations that could be applied to a variety of problems. This procedure gave the Basel
school decisive advantages in representing transcendental quantities and in deciding which
orders of infinitesimals could safely be neglected in given circumstances.
Otherwise, however, as Guicciardini is at pains to point out, the difference between the ap-
proaches of the two schools is largely pragmatic. The Leibnizians and Newtonians pursued
different policies. The Newtonians’ main aim was the establishment of Newton’s natural
philosophy, and to this end the analytical method was seen as embedded in a synthetic
geometry, an understanding that guaranteed its continuity with ancient tradition as well
as with its ontological content. By contrast, the Continentals were intent upon exploring
the heuristic possibilities of their algorithms, which they freely admitted could be divorced
from questions of interpretation. Even the supposed difference in foundations (infinitesi-
mals versus limits of ratios) largely evaporates under close scrutiny. As Guicciardini argues,
Leibniz was no more committed to the existence of infinitesimals than Newton, regarding
them as variable quantities in a state of approaching zero, with demonstrations involving
them in principle replaceable by limit-based proofs. Although I think Guicciardini goes too
far in suggesting that Leibniz’s talk of “incomparably small quantities” in his Tentamen
might be an adaptation to Newton’s “vanishing quantities” in the Principia—Leibniz had
characterized his infinitely small quantities as “incomparable” since his Theoria Motus
Abstract of 1671—nevertheless, there is no doubt that Leibniz (who had already charac-
terized the circle in terms of a limit of inscribed or circumscribed polygons in unpublished
work of 1676) found Newton’s limit terminology increasingly attractive.
In sum Guicciardini has produced an authoritative, searching, and profoundly illumi-
nating examination of Newton’s mathematical methods, and the controversies that swirled
around them for the five decades after first publication. In so doing he has made a major
contribution to the history of mathematics from Newton to Euler and greatly enhanced
our understanding of this period of intellectual history. His book will be welcomed by all
Newton scholars, as well as students of the history of mathematics, physics, and astronomy.
